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SIXTH-CENTURY INTUITIVE PROBABILITY: THE 
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DK-4000 ROSKILDE, DENMARK 
Recently, a number of works have been devoted solely or in 
part to tracing "precursors" of probabilistic reasoning, in- 
cluding [Rabinovitch 1973; Hacking 1975; Garber & Zabell 1979; 
Schneider 1977, 19811. Thus far, one very early instance of 
such reasoning seems to have escaped notice. Both because of 
its age and, especially, because of its specific mode of reason- 
ing, it might prove worth investigating. 
In Book IV, Chapter 48, of the History of the Franks, 
Gregory of Tours relates the looting of the monastery of Latte. 
In Thorpe's translation the report runs as follows: 
A force of hostile troops approached and prepared to 
cross the river. [...I "This is the monastery of 
Saint Martin!" cried the monks. "You Francs must not 
cross over here?" Most of those who heard this were 
filled with the fear of God and so withdrew. Twenty 
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of their number, who did not fear God and had no re- 
spect for the blessed Saint, climbed into a boat and 
crossed the river. Driven on by the Devil himself, 
they slaughtered the monks, damaged the monastery and 
stole its possessions, which last they made into 
bundles and piled on their boat. Then they pushed off 
into the stream, but their keel began to sway to and 
fro, and they were carried round and round. They had 
lost their oars, which might have saved them. They 
tried to reach the bank by pushing the butts of their 
spears into the bed of the river, but the boat split 
apart beneath their feet. They were all pierced 
through by the points of their lances, which they were 
holding against their bodies; they were all transfixed 
and were killed by their own javelins. Only one of 
them remained unhurt, a man who had rebuked the others 
for what they were doing. If anyone thinks that this 
happened by chance, let him consider the fact that one 
innocent man was saved among so many who were doing 
evil (emphasis added, J. H.). [Thorpe 1974, 2451 
In the critical edition of 
final passage is no different: 
the Latin text, the sense of the 
Unus tantum ex ipsis, qui eos increpabat ne ista com- 
mitterent, remansit inlaesus. Quod si hoc quis fortuitu 
evenisse iudicat, cernat, unum insontem plurimis 
evasisse de noxiis. [Arndt 1885, 183 f.] 
As is the case with most instances of pre-Pascalian proba- 
bilistic reasoning discussed by the authors quoted in the Intro- 
duction, this piece of reasoning is purely qualitative. There 
is absolutely no trace of a calculus, i.e., a quantitative cal- 
culation, of probabilities. In this respect, Gregory's argument 
is on a par with many other pre-Modern precursors of the mathe- 
matical theory of probability, as developed in the late 17th 
century. 
Still, inside the field of intuitive and qualitative proba- 
bilistic reasoning, Gregory's argument belongs to a genre of 
its own, one not mentioned by any of the above-mentioned authors 
(with one partial exception; cf. below). It constitutes as much 
a test of significance as can be achieved inside the qualitative 
framework: it compares two hypotheses, one mentioned explicitly 
("by chance" [fortuitu]) , the other given only implicitly ("not 
by chance," that is, by Divine Providence, by miracle), and 
gives the intuitive, qualitative evidence that the fortuitu 
hypothesis must be rejected ("one innocent man . . . among so 
many" [unum insontem plurimis]). 
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Qualitative as this is, it is still closer to mathematics 
than the arguments on probable truth advanced by the Ancient 
Sceptics (cf. [Schneider 1977, 176-1781). It is no less mathe- 
matical than a partly parallel discussion from the Talmud re- 
lated by Rabinovitch [l], and it is comparable to a passage from 
Cardan's autobiography, according to which 
in a fair game at hazards only three spots [with three 
dice] is a natural occurrence, and deserves to be so 
deemed; and even when they come up the same way for a 
second time, if the throw be repeated. If the third 
and fourth plays are the same, surely there is occasion 
for suspicion on the part of a prudent man. [Stoner 
1930, 1501 [2] 
Cardan wrote in 1575. Gregory's argument is dated almost a 
thousand years earlier, to c. A.D. 590 [3]. Without diminishing 
Gregory's intellectual greatness, it is possible that he may 
have been less than completely original in this case. After 
all, A.D. 590 was not a year marked in the West by significant 
traces of mathematical activity of any kind. It fell within a 
decade of the midpoint between the death of Boethius (A.D. 524) 
and the birth of Bede (A.D. 672/673), i.e., between the final 
and feeble revival of Ancient mathematics and the first modest 
beginnings of medieval mathematics in the West. Furthermore, 
instruction in a bishop's familia (the bishop's household, 
where he had to instruct young boys as future clerks) in 
Merovingian Gaul was hardly a place where even qualitative math- 
ematics was to be learned (see [Rich4 1979, 19-41, esp. p. 401). 
Gregory received his only formal education in the episcopal 
familia. Later in life he read Latin letters (see [Rich6 1979, 
20; Thorpe 1974, 8 f.]), which certainly helped to raise his 
level as a humanist, but which can hardly have taught him much 
about mathematics. Consequently, it would not be surprising if 
antecedents for Gregory's "test" of the significance of a 
miracle were to be found in the literature with which he was 
familiar. One place to look might be in patristic writings, 
especially, perhaps, the apologetic fathers, to whom such a 
test might have seemed apropos. 
On the other hand, the fact that such an argument was made 
at all by the highly intelligent but mathematically illiterate 
Gregory may be taken as evidence that statistical intuitions 
are not--and were not-- necessarily dependent on mathematical 
training; whether Gregory borrowed the argument or invented it 
himself, he understood it. His understanding, however, had 
little to do with formal mathematical knowledge. Instead, it 
was another instance of his general reflective and critical 
approach to the world. Gregory's modest and absolutely inef- 
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fectual contribution to the prehistory of statistical theory 
suggests that only part of the truth on "the emergence of prob- 
ability" will be found by the search for definite intellectual 
currents which have given rise to the modern concept of proba- 
bility by being integrated with each other. 
NOTES 
1. According to a case raised in the Talmud, a widow 
"married her brother-in-law before the required three-month 
waiting-peroid had elapsed, and although at three months after 
her husband's death there were no external signs of pregnancy, 
she gave birth to a child scarcely six months later, i.e., 
hardly nine months after her first husband's death. [...I [The 
case leads to the following] Talmudic argument: 'The majority 
of women bear [a child] only after nine months' pregnancy . . . 
and for most women who bear at nine months, pregnancy is al- 
ready recognizable at one third term, but this one, since it 
was unrecognized at one third term, the majority is weakened.' 
Rashi [an 11th century commentator] adds: 'You cannot put her 
into the majority of women, but it is a doubt whether she belongs 
to the minority or the majority"' [Rabinovitch 1973, 59-60; 
internal quotations are Rabinovitch's quotations from the Talmud 
and from Rashi]. 
2. Incidentally, this passage stands as an argument by 
analogy when Cardan argues from a series of strange coincidences 
that his life has been guided by a supernatural providence. So, 
the coupling between the Ancient understanding of probabilitas 
and the games of chance, definitely achieved in the 17th century, 
is already on its way by 1575. 
3. The chapter does not appear in the early B-version of 
six books and so belongs to the revision of the work which 
Gregory made late in life (see [Arndt 1885, 23, 183; Omont 1886, 
xii, 1381). 
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SOME COMMENTS ON RIEMANN'S CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO DIFFERENTIAL GEOMETRY 
BY J. D. ZUND 
NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
LAS CRUCES, NM 88003 
In a recent article in this journal E. Portnoy [1982] gave 
an interesting assessment of Riemann's contribution to differ- 
ential geometry. In the present note I would like to comment 
briefly on some material which was not mentioned in her discus- 
sion. 
Although her article includes a number of references, it 
neglects to mention what is undoubtedly the most profound and 
interesting version of Riemann's probationary lecture. This is 
[Riemann 1868/1919], which features a detailed commentary by 
Hermann Weyl. In the third (and final) edition of this forty- 
eight page monograph more than half of the contents is taken up 
